In light of recent extraordinary events in the US (see Jeffrey Goldberg’s [editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine] March 24, 2025 article “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans; U.S. national-security leaders included me in a group chat about upcoming military strikes in Yemen. I didn’t think it could be real. Then the bombs started falling.”)—an own goal—and my (FrogHeart) recent spate of cyberthreat postings, I thought it would be a good idea to look a little more closely at cyberthreats and, by extension, cyber security.
How did a reporter end up in a White House chat group preparing to launch a military strike?
Tom Gerken’s March 26, 2025 article for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) news online website provides a brief overview of the situation before launching into a description and discussion of Signal security app, Note: Links have been removed,
The messaging app Signal has made headlines after the White House confirmed it was used for a secret group chat between senior US officials.
The editor-in-chief of the [sic] Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, was inadvertently added to the group where plans for a strike against the Houthi group in Yemen were discussed.
Signal’s creator Matthew Rosenfeld – who is better known by the pseudonym Moxie Marlinspike – joked the “great reasons” to join the platform now included “the opportunity for the vice president of the United States of America to randomly add you to a group chat for coordination of sensitive military operations”.
But others are not seeing the funny side, with Democrat Senate leader Chuck Schumer calling it “one of the most stunning” military intelligence leaks in history and calling for an investigation.
But what actually is Signal – and how secure or otherwise were the senior politicians’ communications on it?
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Signal has estimated 40-70 million monthly users – making it pretty tiny compared to the biggest messaging services, WhatsApp and Messenger, which count their customers in the billions.
Where it does lead the way though is in security.
At the core of that is end-to-end encryption (E2EE).
Simply put, it means only the sender and the receiver can read messages – even Signal itself cannot access them.
A number of other platforms also have E2EE – including WhatsApp – but Signal’s security features go beyond this.
For example, the code that makes the app work is open source – meaning anybody can check it to make sure there are no vulnerabilities that hackers could exploit.
Its owners say it collects far less information from its users, and in particular does not store records of usernames, profile pictures, or the groups people are part of.
There is also no need to dilute these features to make more money: Signal is owned by the Signal Foundation, a US-based non-profit, which relies on donations rather than ad revenue.
“Signal is the gold standard in private comms,” said its boss Meredith Whittaker in a post on X after the US national security story became public.
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Gerken goes on to explain why the “gold standard in private comms” was problematic, from the March 26, 2025 article,
That “gold standard claim” is what makes Signal appealing to cybersecurity experts and journalists, who often use the app.
But even that level of security is considered insufficient for very high level conversations about extremely sensitive national security matters.
That is because there is a largely unavoidable risk to communicating via a mobile phone: it is only as secure as the person that uses it.
If someone gains access to your phone with Signal open – or if they learn your password – they’ll be able to see your messages.
And no app can prevent someone peeking over your shoulder if you are using your phone in a public space.
Data expert Caro Robson, who has worked with the US administration, said it was “very, very unusual” for high ranking security officials to communicate on a messaging platform like Signal.
“Usually you would use a very secure government system that is operated and owned by the government using very high levels of encryption,” she said.
She said this would typically mean devices kept in “very secure government controlled locations”.
The US government has historically used a sensitive compartmented information facility (Scif – pronounced “skiff”) to discuss matters of national security.
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Gerken notes another problem, given these were government communications, from the March 26, 2025 article, Note: A link has been removed,
There’s another issue tied to Signal that has raised concerns – disappearing messages.
Signal, like many other messaging apps, allows its users to set messages to disappear after a set period of time.
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This may violate laws around record-keeping – unless those using the app forwarded on their messages to an official government account.
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… as this controversy shows, no level of security or legal protection matters if you simply share your confidential data with the wrong person.
Or as one critic more bluntly put it: “Encryption can’t protect you from stupid.”
There’s a March 25, 2025 article on Salon by Lucian K. Truscott IV (… a graduate of West Point, has had a 50-year career as a journalist, novelist and screenwriter. He has covered stories such as Watergate, the Stonewall riots and wars in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. …), which provides more insight about this breach from someone who might be termed a military insider.
What about the rest of us and our cyberthreats/security?
In the wake of this scandal I’ve received two unsolicited pieces (an editorial and a commentary) on cybersecurity (both received via email on March 25, 2025). Both offer what I consider to be good tips for your own cybersecurity. That said, these are not endorsements from me.
First up, I have this “Why It’s a Bad Idea to Share Secrets, Even Via the Safest Apps” editorial by Jurgita Lapienytė for cybernews.com
The Trump Administration discussed a secret military operation on Signal, inadvertently adding Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to the thread. Until the bombs started dropping in Yemen, Goldberg couldn’t believe what he was reading.
Even if Goldberg hadn’t been included in the chat, it remains a terrible idea to discuss matters of national security via any app, no matter how secure it is considered. This point, while likely to ruffle some feathers in the political arena, should also serve as a stark reminder that nothing you do online is truly anonymous.
Here’s what you should consider before confiding your secrets to technology:
- You are more interesting than you think.
It’s a common misconception that regular citizens like you and me are of no interest to hackers. However, a threat actor could exploit your device to gain access to your employer. By exploiting the data on your phone, a hacker could steal your identity and potentially cripple the entire organization.
- Don’t blindly trust what technology companies tell you.
Encrypted chat apps Signal and WhatsApp are publicly debating which one is more secure. Meredith Whittaker, the president of Signal, appears to be particularly annoyed by WhatsApp’s Will Cathcart, who suggests there are hardly any differences between WhatsApp and Signal.
While Signal is generally considered a more trustworthy choice by the security community — and it’s worth noting that WhatsApp is owned by Meta — I still recommend exercising caution when using either app.
Recall how in 2021, Proton, another security-focused company, provided the IP address of a French activist to law enforcement due to legal obligations. Many remain upset about this incident, but it also serves as a reminder, as Proton’s Andy Yen noted, that “the Internet is generally not anonymous.”
- Governments are increasingly asking for a backdoor.
The “good guys,” meaning law enforcement, want to have a key to your communication just in case it can be instrumental in some criminal case. Governments have long argued that end-to-end encrypted communication is an obstacle when trying to solve high-profile human trafficking, drug trafficking, and child exploitation cases, among others.
In some countries, the “good guys” might actually succeed in having those backdoors installed. While such amendments are theoretically intended to target only criminals, they set a very dangerous precedent. This is because governments often view protesters, dissidents, and political opponents as threats to national security or even sovereignty, effectively treating them as criminals.
- Your phone might get stolen.
Are you the only one who knows your phone’s passcode? Is it a random sequence of numbers or something more meaningful, like someone’s birthday? Imagine what would happen if Goldberg’s phone were stolen. While it’s not child’s play to unlock it, it can be cracked through brute force.
Even though Signal offers encryption, the recent leak of military plans emphasizes the need for caution, even on trusted platforms. It’s crucial for every user, including government officials, to double-check contact identities, use additional layers like two-factor authentication, and be mindful of what’s shared. No tool is foolproof, and the failure to implement proper security measures shows that awareness and caution are just as important as the technology in use.
ABOUT THE EXPERT
Jurgita Lapienytė is the Editor-in-Chief at Cybernews, where she leads a team of journalists and security experts dedicated to uncovering cyber threats through research, testing, and data-driven reporting. With a career spanning over 15 years, she has reported on major global events, including the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 Paris terror attacks, and has driven transparency through investigative journalism. A passionate advocate for cybersecurity awareness and women in tech, Jurgita has interviewed leading cybersecurity figures and amplifies underrepresented voices in the industry. Recognized as the Cybersecurity Journalist of the Year and featured in Top Cyber News Magazine’s 40 Under 40 in Cybersecurity, she is a thought leader shaping the conversation around cybersecurity.
I haven’t been able to find out much about cybernews but the articles look interesting and give you some idea as to what’s happening in other parts of the world (i.e., outside Canada and the US). Here’s how the outlet describes itself on its About Us webpage, Note: A link has been removed,
We glimpse into the deep, not just trends.
Cybernews is an independent media outlet, where journalists and security experts debunk cyber by research, testing and data.
Come for breaking news, original investigations and other curious tech stories.
Our Cybernews Investigation team uses white-hat hacking techniques to find and safely disclose cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities across the online world. Leaks of users’ personal information? Security flaws in enterprises? Exchanges of sensitive data on the dark web? We’re on it.
The Cybernews Editorial team provides cybersecurity-related news, analysis, and opinions by industry insiders. We are working independently and transparently following our Editorial guidelines.
Next up is the “7 Ways Your Encrypted Messaging App Isn’t Protecting Your Privacy” commentary by Kee Jefferys, co-founder of Session, Note: There is a bit of self-interest in this commentary mixed in with some helpful observations, Note: Links have been removed,
The recent revelation of sensitive war plans mistakenly being shared in a Signal group chat, the vulnerability of widely used “secure” messaging platforms like Signal, Telegram and WhatsApp has been exposed once again. While Signal is often regarded as one of the most private messaging apps available, this incident highlights the hidden risks of centralized infrastructure, metadata exposure, and identity-linked registration requirements. Kee Jefferys, Co-founder of Session—a decentralized ‘truly’ secure encrypted messaging app resolving privacy breaches other apps expose users to—can provide expert commentary on the limitations of mainstream encrypted messaging services, why government and high-security entities need stronger privacy protections, and how truly private alternatives exist. Jefferys can also discuss best practices for secure digital communication, ensuring sensitive data remains confidential in high-stakes environments. This includes the “7 Hidden Risks” of using seemingly secure messaging apps, including compromised anonymity as detailed in the below narrative, and why governments and other high-risk entities should demand messaging solutions that prioritize decentralization, no-logs policies, and open-source transparency. Interest here as we hope?
7 Ways Your Encrypted Messaging App Isn’t Protecting Your Privacy
How to Choose a ‘Truly’ Secure Messenger App
In today’s digital age, instant messaging has become an integral part of our lives. We rely on these platforms for everything from casual chats to mission-critical communications. While many popular messaging apps boast “end-to-end encryption,” the reality is that they often fail to provide true privacy. The issue lies not just in the content of your messages, but in the vast amount of metadata these platforms collect.
In an era of mass surveillance, data breaches, and digital tracking, privacy-conscious users have turned to encrypted messaging apps to secure their conversations. However, while many platforms market themselves as private and secure, the reality is that they often fall short of providing true anonymity. Even the most well-known apps—like WhatsApp and Telegram —still leave users exposed in ways they may not realize.
Here’s why your encrypted messaging app might not be as private as you think.
1. Metadata Collection: The Silent Tracker
Even with end-to-end encryption, apps like WhatsApp and Telegram collect metadata, including your IP address, phone number, timestamps, and who you’re communicating with. This data can be just as revealing as the message content itself, allowing governments, corporations, and hackers to track your activities.
End-to-end encryption protects message content, but it does nothing to stop metadata collection, which can include information like:
- Who you are messaging
- When you send and receive messages
- Your IP address, location and phone number
- The device you use
Even if a service cannot read your messages, it can still compile detailed behavioral profiles based on metadata alone. Governments, corporations, and malicious actors can analyze this data to track movements, map social networks, and infer behaviors.
2. Personal Identifier Requirements Compromise Anonymity
Apps like WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal require a phone number for registration. This links your online identity to your real-world identity, compromising your anonymity. For journalists, activists, or individuals in sensitive situations, this can be a serious risk.3. Centralized Servers Are Vulnerable to Surveillance and Attacks
Many popular messaging apps rely on centralized servers, creating a single point of failure. These servers are vulnerable to government requests, data breaches, and corporate misuse, putting your data at risk. Centralized servers pose risks for significant exposures, including:
- Hacks and Data Breaches: If a centralized server is compromised, vast amounts of user data can be exposed.
- Single Point of Failure: A centralized infrastructure makes it easier for despotic governments or hackers to shut down or intercept communications.
- Government Requests: Authorities can compel these companies to provide user data or enforce censorship.
4. Compromised Anonymity: Not All Encryption Is Equal
While some apps advertise end-to-end encryption, they may not be using it by default in all scenarios. For example:
- Telegram does not use end-to-end encryption by default, users must specifically use “Secret Chats” to enable end-to-end encryption, this allows the Telegram server operators to read the content of the vast majority of messages stored on its servers.
- Some apps use proprietary encryption methods that have not been independently audited.
- Some platforms allow unencrypted backups, meaning your messages can be accessed if a backup is
5. Tracking Pixels and Link Previews Leak Data
Some apps generate link previews by fetching URLs in the background. This can expose your IP address to third parties or even result in unwanted metadata leaks. Tracking pixels embedded in messages can also report when, where, and by whom a message was viewed.
6. Logging and Data Retention Policies
Even if messages are encrypted, some services keep logs of:
- Login activity
- Connection times
- IP addresses
- Contacts lists
If this data is stored, it can be subpoenaed, hacked, or otherwise exploited.
7. Lack of Transparency:
While some apps use robust encryption protocols, their closed-source nature limits transparency. Without public scrutiny and independent audits, it’s difficult to verify their security claims.
How to Choose a Truly Private Messenger
If you’re serious about privacy, you need a messaging app that prioritizes security beyond just encryption. Here’s what to look for:
- No Phone Number or Email Required. Your messaging app should not require personally identifiable information like a phone number or email address to register. Instead, look for apps that generate anonymous cryptographically secure identifiers, fully protecting your anonymity.
- Decentralized Infrastructure. Choose a platform that operates on a decentralized network rather than centralized servers. This reduces the risk of surveillance, censorship, and single points of failure. Optimal solutions use community-operated nodes to route and store messages. This eliminates single points of failure and enhances censorship resistance.
- Metadata Minimization. A truly private messenger should collect and create as little metadata as possible—or none at all. Look for a “no logs” policy and open-source transparency. Ensure that even the developers of the app don’t know who you’re communicating with.
- Open-Source and Audited Encryption. Only trust messaging apps with publicly available, open-source encryption protocols that have been independently audited. Open-source code allows for public scrutiny and independent audits, which ensures transparency and builds trust.
- Onion Routing or Multi-Hop Encryption. For enhanced privacy, apps should use onion routing or multi-hop routing to obscure sender and receiver identities. This technology masks your IP address and location, adding an extra layer of privacy making it extremely difficult to track you.
- Non-Profit Governance: Give precedence to apps run by non-profits and foundations, which can ensure that the app’s development is driven by privacy and security, rather than extracting value from users’ data.
If you value real privacy, don’t just settle for encryption—demand anonymity, decentralization, and complete metadata resistance. By eliminating the creation and collection of metadata, users can send messages—not metadata. In a digital landscape where privacy is constantly under attack, choosing a truly secure messaging app is more critical today than ever before.
~~~Kee Jefferys is Co-founder of Session—an end-to-end open-source, privacy-focused encrypted messaging app that prioritizes anonymity, security, and decentralization while maintaining the familiar features of mainstream messaging applications but prohibiting sensitive metadata collection that others allow. It’s designed for people who want privacy and freedom from any forms of surveillance. He can be reached at https://getsession.org.
There is a Wikipedia entry for Session, Note: Links have been removed,
Session is a cross-platform end-to-end encrypted instant messaging application emphasizing user confidentiality and anonymity. Developed by The Oxen Project under the non-profit Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation [emphasis mine], it employs a blockchain-based decentralized network for transmission. Users can send one-to-one and group messages, including various media types such as files, voice notes, images, and videos.[3]
Session provides applications for various platforms, such as macOS, Windows, and Linux, along with mobile clients available on both iOS and Android.
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I looked up Oxen and found two different sites and, possibly, two different organizations. Here’s oxen.io,
What is Oxen?
Oxen is many things. A private cryptocurrency. A secure messaging platform. A network anonymity layer. A vision for a future where privacy is effortless.
We provide a range of tools and services powered by the Oxen network, enabling people all over the world to leverage the power of decentralised blockchain networks to achieve unparalleled privacy and security as they work, play, and live their day-to-day lives on the internet. But this this isn’t a plan we have for the future — our suite of privacy tools already exists, and it is already used by over half a million people.
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Then, there’s this Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation (optf.gov), from the About page,
Meet the Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation
We’re a passionate team of advocates, creatives, and engineers building a world where the internet is open, software is free and accessible, and your privacy is protected.
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I’m not sure what to make of the two Oxen. Bottom line: exercise caution and both pieces (editorial and commentary) offer good advice.